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SINCE BOGGS V. PLYBON-THE AUTOMOBILE GUEST
IN VIRGINIA
Since the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Appeals
in the case of Boggs v. Plybon, Virginia has been committed to
the rule that an owner or operator of an automobile is liable to a
guest only for injuries resulting from gross negligence. This rule
was given statutory approval by the Virginia Legislature in 1938
in the form of a "Guest Statute."2
Much has been written criticizing this limitation on a guest's
right of recovery in such cases3 and it is not the purpose of
this note to re-examine the respective merits of the gross negligence
rule and of the rule that ordinary negligence is sufficient for a re-
covery by a guest in automobile accident cases. It is directed, rather,
toward applications of the "Guest Statute" of Virginia and, where
necessary, those of other states which have statutes of similar import
with a view toward clarification of some of the more difficult prob-
lems involved in construing the statute.
Code of Virginia § 8-646.1 (1950) provides: "No person
transported by the owner or operator of any motor vehicle as a
guest without payment for such transportation . . . shall be entitled
to recover damages for death or injuries ... unless such was caused
by or resulted from the gross negligence or wilful and wanton
disregard of the safety of the person or property of the person being
so transported on the part of such owner or operator."
Who is a "guest" within the purview of the statute? The
Restatement, Torts § 490, cited by the federal court 4 in applying
the Virginia statute defines "guest" as "The word ... used to denote
one whom the owner or possessor of a motor car or other vehicle
invites or permits to ride with him as a gratuity, that is, without
any financial return, except such slight benefits as it is customary
to extend as a part of the ordinary courtesies of the road."
Despite general acceptance, the definition does not completely
solve the problem, for a line must be drawn to denote the point at
which the driver or owner receives financial return other than
those prescribed by the ordinary courtesies of the road.
The North Carolina Court, in construing the Virginia Statute,
1. 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1950).
3. E.g. 18 VA. L. REv. 342 (1932); 20 VA.L. REv. 326 (1934).
4. Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1940).
has held that if the carriage is primarily for the attainment of some
objective or purpose of the owner or operator of the automobile,
then the passenger is not a "guest" within the meaning of the
statute.5
No guest-host relationship existed where a part-time employee
was driven home to get something to eat by an agent of her em-
ployer. 6 Nor was such a relationship existing where plaintiff
received a salary of $3.00 per week, meals, and transportation from
her employer, defendant.7
In its treatment of the statute in Morse v. Walker,8 the court
held that where an agreement, entered into between the driver and
his passenger, obliges the passenger to purchase gas and oil to be
consumed on the trip, such agreement being a condition or con-
sideration without which the trip would not have been under-
taken, such payment constituted "payment for transportation"
within the meaning of the Virginia Statute. 9 It is not enough,
however, to remove the plaintiff from the "guest" category that
he merely pays his own expenses and agrees to share the burden of
driving.10 Even where the one transported understands that he is
to share the expenses of a social trip he is still a "guest" within
the purview of the statute unless there is an actual contractual
relationship.11 Thus while it has never been decided by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, it would seem reasonable to conclude,
from the cases at hand construing the Virginia Statute, as well as
those involving comparable statutes of other states1 2 that the effect
of the sharing of expenses by the one transported is dependent
upon its voluntary nature.
Benefits accruing to the driver or owner were held not sub-
stantial enough to remove the person transported from the guest
category in Gale v. Wilbur 5 where plaintiff was invited to ac-
company defendant to meet her husband; in Brown v. Branch
14
where plaintiff assisted defendant, superintendent of a Sunday
School which gave free transportation to a picnic to plaintiff and
5. Hale v. Hale, 219 N.C. 191, 13 S.E.2d 221 (1941).
6. White v. Gregory, 161 Va. 414, 170 S.E. 739 (1933).
7. Garrett v. Hammack, 162 Va. 42, 173 SE. 535 (1934).
8. 229 N.C. 778, 51 S.E.2d 496 (1949).
9. Accord:, Fortuna v. Sangster, 269 Apt). Div. 1060, 59 N.Y.S.2d 190,
affirmed 296 N.Y. 923, 73 N.E.2d 40 (1947).
10. Mayer v. Puryear, supra.
11. 27 VA. L REv. 560 (1941).
12. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehides § 399(5).
13. 163 Va. 211, 175 S.E. 739 (1934).
14. 175 Va. 382, 9 S.E.2d 285 (1940).
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others but required them to pay for their food; nor in Miller v.
Ellis"5 where plaintiff had made a neighborly offer to defendant to
help move material in a truck.
While one may start the journey as a guest, his status may
change during the course of the trip. Thus in Braxton v. Flippo16
where plaintiff, an 18-year-old boy in defendant's employ, requested
defendant to take him to a friend's house when he left work, and
defendant undertook to do so, plaintiff's status became no longer
that of a guest when, on developing engine trouble, defendant told
plaintiff to take the wheel while he poured gasoline into the car-
buretor. It was held that recovery could be had for the resulting
injury if ordinary negligence could be proved.
Virginia has never had occasion to test the applicability of the
"Guest Statute" to the "car pools" and "share the ride programs"
which were so abundant in World War II and which still exist in
a limited number. However, in those states where the issue has been
raised, the weight of authority seems to be with the view that the
rides given to one's fellow workers in such a pool are not given
gratuitously but are in exchange for transportation and thus the
character of the guest-host relationship is not assumed. 17 Likewise,
one who paid the owner of the automobile $3.00 per week and
signed ration applications to help defendant secure gas and tires
was held not to be a guest.' 8 And in Bond v. Sharp19 where two
parties agreed to alternate weekly in the use of their automobiles
with a five dollar penalty on the driver who failed to drive during
his week, and where subsequently one of the vehicles broke down
and each party agreed to drive for two weeks, held: the party
being transported was a "passenger" and not a "guest." Even so,
there is authority for the proposition 'that such transportation
involves only social amenities between fellow workers and that
the guest-host relationship does exist, even though one member of
the group, being without a car, pays a set amount each week.to the
driver.20
15. 188 Va. 207, 49 S.E2d 273 (1948).
16. 183 Va. 839, 33 S.E.2d 757 (1945).
17. Huebotter v. Follett, 27 Cal2d 765, 167 P.2d 193 (1946); Ott v.
Perrin, 116 Ind. App. 315, 63 N.E.2d 163 (1945); Sparks v. Getz, 170
Kan. 287, 225 P.2d 106 (1950); Coerver v. Haab, 23 Wash.2d 481,
161 P.2d 194 (1945).
18. Dennis- v. Wood, 357 Mo. 886, 211 S.W.2d 470 (1948).
19. 325 Mich. 460, 39 N.W.2d 37 (1949).
20. Everett v. Burg, 301 Mich. 734, 4 N.W.2d 63 (1942).
Not the least of the problems involved in construing the Vir-
ginia Guest Statute is that of determining what constitutes gross
negligence. It is for the plaintiff to sustain the burden of proof on
the issue of gross negligence 2 and where no primary negligence
is shown, the measure of duty owed to the guest is immaterial.2 2
There is no well defined dividing line between simple negligence
and gross negligence but the distinction is one of degree.2 3 Gross
negligence has been defined as "an utter disregard of prudence
amounting to complete neglect of the safety" of the guest,24 "heed-
less and reckless disregard of the rights of the guest," 25 and conduct
"such as to shock fairminded men."' 26 A degree of care which is
sufficient -under one set of circumstances may amount to gross
negligence under others.27 The breach of one, two, or more
statutory duties will not in itself sustain a finding of gross negligence
within the meaning of the "Guest Statute" 28 but if a number of acts
of omission and commission are combined in such a manner that
reasonable and fairminded men might differ as to whether the
cumulative effect thereof constitutes gross negligence then the
question is for the jury.29
Whether or not there has been gross negligence is usually
for the jury30 and has been so held in Thomas v. Snow31 vvhere
defendant went into the left lane to avoid a collision and did not
return to the right in time to avoid the accident in question; in
McGehee v. Perkins32 where defendant struck a truck parked and
with a flare burning, and in Mountjoy v. Burton3 3 where the auto-
mobile was worn with use and had defective parts in the front end
which made high speeds hazardous and where defendant was
traveling at a high speed when the accident occurred. One who goes
to sleep while driving may be found grossly negligent by the jury34
21. Woodrum v. Holland, 185 Va. 690, 40 S.X2d 169 (1946); Grinstead
v. Mayhew, 167 Va. 19, 187 S.E. 515 (1936).
22. Universal Tractor Co. v. Boling, 161 Va. 408, 170 S.E. 585 (1933).
23. Krueger et al. v. Taylor, 37 F.Supp. 412 (D. D.C. 1941).
24. Wright v. Osborne, 175 Va. 442, 9 S.E.2d 452 (1940).
25. Woodrum v. Holland, supra.
26. Carroll v. Miller, 175 Va. 388, 9 S.E.2d 322 (1940).
27. McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390, 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952).
28. Mitchell v. Wilkerson, 193 Va. 121, 67 S.E.2d 912 (1951).
29. Ibid.
30. Hill v. Bradley, 186 Va. 394, 43 S.E.2d 29 (1947).
31. 162 Va. 654, 174 S.E. 837 (1934).
32. 188 Va. 116, 49 S.E.2d 304 (1948).
33. 185 Va. 936. 40 S.E.2d 803 (1947).
34. Lee v. Moore, 168 Va. 278, 191 S.E. 589 (1937).
as may one who passes a number of cars on a curve while traveling
at a fairly high rate of speed and runs into a stopped car without
diminishing his speed.35 Of course these are merely illustrative
cases and each case must depend upon its peculiar facts.3 6
Where only one reasonable inference may be drawn from the
facts of the case then the question of gross negligence becomes one
of law. 37 In Kent v. Miller,38 where the door of a new car became
unlatched, causing injury to the plaintiff, such was termed an un-
forseeable event and not gross negligence as a matter of law.
In Dinges v. Hannah39 the court ruled out gross negligence
where defendant exceeded the wartime speed limit of 30 m.p.h. and
after being warned of an oncoming car in center lane of a three-lane
highway had an accident, it not appearing that a car was coming
in the center lane until a collision was imminent.
In Hill v. Bradley40 there was no gross negligence as a matter
of law where the defendant was driving carefully at a fair rate of
speed around a curve and the rear wheels of his car caught in ruts
caused by streetcar tracks, causing him to lose control of the car.
Among the cases holding that the facts thereof constitute gross
negligence as a matter of law are Steel v. Crocker,41 in which de-
fendant drove in the left lane to pass three snow plows on a curve at
the crest of a hill, "ignoring statutory requirements and all ordinary
rules of safety" and Remine et al v. Whited42 wherein it was held
that driving a car across an arterial highway without keeping a look-
out when the car was full of women and children was gross negli-
gence.
It appears that as regards "gross negligence" as well as the
determination of who is a "guest," the court finds it easier to submit
the facts of a case to a determination which will preclude recovery
than to one which will permit it.
CLEAVES MANNING
35. Wright v. Osborne, supra.
36. Drumwright v. Walker, 167 Va. 307, 187 S.E. 310 (1937).
37. Hill v. Bradley, spura.
38. 167 Va. 422, 189 S.E. 332 (1937).
39. 185 Va. 744, 40 S.E.2d 179 (1946).
40. 186 Va. 394, 43 S.E.2d 29 (1947).
41. 191 Va. 873, 62 S.E.2d 850 (1951).
42. 180 Va. 1. 21 SX.2d 743 (1942).
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